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1914 '6 8 20 24The Great Contraction, 1929-33
Tint cONTRAcTION from 1929 to 1933 was by far the most severe business-
cycle contraction during the near-century of U.S. history we cover and it
may well have been the most severe in the whole of U.S.history. Though
sharper and more prolonged in the United States than in most other coun-
tries, it was worldwide in scope and ranks as the most severe and widely
diffused international contraction of modern times. U.S. net national
product in current prices fell by more than one-half from 1929 to 1933;
net national product in constant prices, by more thanone-third; implicit
prices, by more than one-quarter; and monthly wholesale prices, by more
than one-third.
The antecedents of the contraction have no parallel in the more than
fifty years covered by our monthly data. As noted intile preceding
chapter, no other contraction before or since has been preceded bysuch
a long period over which the money stock failed torise. Monetary
behavior during the contraction itself is even more striking. Fromthe
cyclical peak in August 1929 to the cyclical trough in March 1933, the
stock of money fell by over a third. This is more than triple the largest
preceding declines recorded in our series, the 9 per cent declines from
1875 to 1879 and from 1920 to 1921. More than one-fifth of the com-
mercial banks in the United States holding nearly one-tenth of the
volume of deposits at the beginning of the contraction suspended opera-
tions because of financial difficulties. Voluntary liquidations, mergers,
and consolidations added to the toll, so that the number of commercial
banks fell by well over one-third. The contraction was capped by banking
holidays in many states in early 1933 and by a nationwide banking
holiday that extended from Monday, March 6. until Monday, March
I 3. and closed not only all commercial banks but also the Federal Reserve
Banks. There was no precedent in U.S. history of a concerted closing of
all banks for so extended a period over the entire country.
To find anything in our history remotely comparable to the monetary
collapse from 1929 to 1933. one must go back nearly a century to the con-
traction of 1839 to 1843. That contraction, too, occurred during a period
of worldwide crisis, which intensified the domestic monetary uncertainty
already unleashed by the political battle over the Second Bank ofthe
United States, the failure to renew its charter, and the speculative0
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activities of the successor bank understate charter. After tire lapsing
of the Bank's federal charter,domestic monetary uncertaintywas further
heightened by the successivemeasures adopted by the government--
distribution of the surplus, the SpecieCircular, and establishment ofan
Independent Treasury in 1840 andits dissolution the nextyear. In 1839- 43, as in 1929-33, asubstantial fraction of the bankswent out of business
about a quarter in the earlierand over a third in the latercontraction
and the stock of money fell byabout one-third.'
The 1929-33 contractionhad far-reaching effects inmany directions, not least on monetary institutionsand academic and popular thinking
about the role ofmonetary factors in the economy. Anumber of special
monetary institutions were establishedin the course of thecontraction, notably the ReconstructionFinance Corporation and theFederal Home Loan Banks, arid thepowers of the Federal Reserve Systemwere sub- stantjalk modified. Thecontraction was shortly followedby the enact- rner,t of federal insurance ofbank deposits and by furtherimportant modifications in thepowers of the Federal Reserve System.It was followed also by a brief periodof suspension of goldpa)ments and then by a drastic modification ofthe gold standard whichreduced itto a pale shadow of its former self(see Chapter 8).
The contractionshatteredthe long-heldbelief,which had been strengthened during thel920's, that monetary forceswere important elements in the cyclicalprocess and that monetary policywas a potent instrument for promotingeconomic stability. Opinionshifted almost to the oppositeextreme, that "money doesnot matter"; that it isa passive factor which chieflyreflects the effects of otherforces; and thatmonetary policy is of extremelylimited value inpromoting stability. The evidence summarired in the rest ofthis chaptersuggests that these judgmentsare not valid inferences fromexperience. The monetarycollapse was not the inescapable consequenceof other forces, butrather a largely independent factor which exerteda powerful influenceon the course of events The failure of the FederalReserve Systemto prevent the collapsereflected not the impotence ofmonetary policy but ratherthe particularpolicies fo- lowed by themonetary authorities and, insmaller deeree, theparticular monetary arrangements inexistence.
The contraction is infact a tragictestimonial to theimporta of monetary forces. True,as events unfolded thedecline in theStoc k of money and the near-collapseof the bankingsystem can be regardedas a consequence of nonmoneta-forces in the UnitedStates, andmofletar and nonmonetary forcesin the rest of theworld Everythingdepends on
'For an interestingcomparj,on of the twocontraction, see GeorgeMaceh 'Monetary Disturbancesin the Cnited Stares,
183+.-45," unpublishedPhi) d- sertation, Univet-sity ofChicago, June 1958THE GREAT c0NTRACrION
how much is taken as given. For itis true also, as we shall see, that
different and feasible actions by the monetary authorities could Isave
prevented the decline in the stock of moneyindeed, could have produced
almost arty desired increase inthe money stock. The same actions
would also have eased the banking difficulties appreciably. Prevention
or moderation of the decline in the stock of money, let alone thesubstitu-
tion of monetary expansion, would have reduced the contraction's severity
and almost as certainly its duration. The contraction might still have been
relatively severe. But itis hardly conceivable that money income could
have declined by over one-half and prices by over one-third in the course
of four years if there had been no decline in the stock of money.2
1. The Course of Money, Income, Prices, Velocity, and Interest Rates
Chart 16, which covers the two decades from 1914 to 1933, shows the
magnitude of the contraction in the perspective of a longer period.
Money income declined by 15 per cent from 1929 to 1930, 20 per cent
the next sear, and 27 per cent in the next, and then by a further 5 per
cent from 1932 to 1933, even though the cyclical trough is datedin
March 1933. The rapid decline in prices made the declines in real income
considerably smaller but, even so, real income fell by 11 per cent, 9 per
cent, 18 per cent, and 3 per cent in the four successive years. These are
extraordinary declines for individual years, let alone for four years in
succession. All told, money income fell 53 per cent and real income 36
per cent, or at continuous annual rates of 19 per cent and 11 per cent,
respectively, over the four-year period.
Already by 1931, money income was lower than it had been in any year
since 1917 and, by 1933, real income was a trifle below the level it had
reached in 1916, though in the interim population had grown by 23 per
cent. Per capita real income in 1933 was almost the same as in the de-
pression year of 1908. a quarter of a century earlier. Four years of con-
traction had temporarily erased the gains of two decades, not, of course,
by erasing the advances of technology, but by idling men and machines.
At the trough of the depression one person was unemployed for every
three employed.
In terms of annual averagesto render the figures comparable with
the annual income estimatesthe money stock fell at a decidedly lower
2This view has been argued most cogently by Clark Warhurton in a series of
important papers, including: "Monetary Expansion and the Inflationary Gap,"
American Economic Reulew, June 1944, pp. 320, 325-326; "Monetary Theory,
Full Production, and the Great Depression," Economeirica, Apr. 1945, pp. 124-
128; "The Volume of Money and the Price Level Between the World Wars,"
Journal of Political Economy, June 1945, pp. 155-163; "Quantity and Frequency
of Use of Money in the United States, 1919-45," Journal o/ Political Economy,
Oct. 1946, pp. 442-450.